We model problems of allocating disputed properties as generalized exchange economies. Therein, agents have preferences and claims over multiple goods, and the social endowment of each good may not be sufficient to satisfy all individual claims. We focus on market-based allocation rules that...

We model problems of allocating disputed properties as generalized exchange economies. Therein, agents have preferences and claims over multiple goods, and the social endowment of each good may not be sufficient to satisfy all individual claims. We focus on market-based allocation rules that...

We model problems of allocating disputed properties as generalized exchange economies in which agents have preferences and claims over multiple goods, and the social endowment of each good may not be sufficient to satisfy all individual claims. In this context, we investigate procedural and...

In n-agent exchange economies, we show that all efficient and continuous rules are "diagonally dictatorial" over the restricted domain of linear preferences and, in the 2-good case, over the domain of homothetic preferences. The diagonal dictator receives the entire endowment whenever all agents...

We consider risk sharing problems with a single good and ?nite number of states. Agents have a common prior and their preferences are represented in the expected utility form and are risk averse. We study efficient and individually rational risk sharing rules satisfying strategy-proofness, the...

Resource egalitarianism and welfare egalitarianism are two focal conceptions of distributive justice. We show in this paper that they share a solid common ground. To do so, we analyze a simple model of resource allocation in which agents’ abilities (to transform the resource into an...

We study optimal wage schemes for teams, under the presence of budget constraints, in a model in which agents’ effort decisions are mapped into the probability of the team’s success. We show that (first-best) efficiency can only be attained with complex contracts that are vulnerable to ex...

We argue that normative indices of multidimensional inequality do not only measure a distribution’s extent of inequity (i.e., the gaps between the better-off and the worse-off), but also its extent of inefficiency (i.e., the non-realized mutually beneficial exchanges of goods). We provide a...

We present a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with variable demand elasticities and investigate the impact of free trade on welfare and efficiency. First, contrary to the constant elasticity case, in which all gains from trade are due to increasing product diversity, our...