ineffcient allocation. We show that a resale opportunity, where the auction winner can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the …). Resale always reduces all bidders' payoffs and increases the initial seller's revenue. …

In standard auctions with symmetric, independent private value bidders resale creates a role for a speculator - a …

In standard auctions with symmetric, independent private value bidders resale creates a role for a speculator …

In standard auctions with symmetric, independent private value bidders resale creates a role for a speculator - a …

We analyze the role resale creates for zero-value bidders, called speculators, in standard auctions with symmetric … independent private values buyers. English/second-price auctions always have equilibria with active resale markets and positive … profits for a speculator. In first- price/Dutch auctions, the unique equilibrium can involve an active resale market, but is …

In standard auctions with symmetric, independent private value bidders resale creates a role for a speculatorâ …

We analyze how the possibility of resale affects efficiency in multi-object uniform-price auctions with asymmetric … bidders using a combination of theory and experiments. The resale market is modeled as an unstructured bargaining game between … participate in a resale market after the auction. In all treatments, the possibility of resale increases efficiency after the …

In standard auctions with symmetric, independent private value bidders resale creates a role for a speculator' a bidder …