players to which ν will become disconnected. We focus on unilateral link formation and Nash equilibrium. We show existence of …

>Nash equilibrium</em>. We show existence of Nash equilibria and a<em> price of stability</em> of 1 + <em>ο</em>(1) under moderate …

equilibrium which takes into account far-sighted behavior of agents and allows for limited cooperation amongst agents. We show … that an equilibrium process of network formation exists. We also show that there are network structures in which no … equilibrium strategy profile can sustain efficient networks. We then provide sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium …

well known refinements of the Nash equilibrium, namely, perfect Nash equilibrium and proper Nash equilibrium, are special … Nash equilibrium is shown to exist for every game. In symmetric bimatrix games, our results imply the existence of a … symmetric proper equilibrium. Applying our results to the field of evolutionary game theory yields a refinement of the …

Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steady-states of a learning … that possesses a self-confirming equilibrium in extensive-form rationalizable strategies. This notion of equilibrium can be …

relying on first order conditions, the authors demonstrate existence of Nash equilibrium and an extension of Warr's neutrality … result -- any redistribution of endowment that left the set of contributors unchanged would induce a new equilibrium with the … the strategic market game equilibrium to the private provision of equilibrium of Villanaci and Zenginobuz (2005), which …

and services, and construction of a model of market equilibrium, based on the principles of the Economic Sociodynamics … the universal motive of public guardianship and limiting, or marginal, conditions of equilibrium for such markets. Besides …

consumers, and show the existence and efficiency of equilibrium with nonlinear policies. We employ entrepreneurial equilibrium …, an equilibrium concept with profit-seeking entrepreneurs. In our model, club managers and members of clubs care only … about the members' actions, not their types. The equilibrium is efficient in our adverse selection model due to this …