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It is often argued that a mandatory minimum wage is binding only if the wage density displays a spike at it. In this paper we analyze a model with search frictions and heterogeneous production technologies, in which imposition of a minimum wage affects wages even though, after imposition, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261543
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012128384
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365853
Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steady-states of a learning process because players may discover novel actions during play. In this sense, many games with unawareness are ''self-destroying'' as a player's representation of the game may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012655887
Static or dynamic equilibrium notions used in game theory may be justified along two perspectives. From an epistemic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011187216
It is often argued that a mandatory minimum wage is binding only if the wage density displays a spike at it. In this Paper we analyse a model with search frictions and heterogeneous production technologies, in which imposition of a minimum wage affects wages even though, after imposition, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666625
It is often argued that a mandatory minimum wage is binding only if the wage density displays a spike at it. In this paper we analyze a model with search frictions and heterogeneous production technologies, in which imposition of a minimum wage affects wages even though, after imposition, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703158
Many models in the economics literature deal with strategic situations with privately informed agents. In those models the information structure is assumed to be exogenous and common knowledge. We consider whether such models, and the results they produce, are robust with respect the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005248476
We formally incorporate the option to gather information into a game and thus endogenize the information structure. We ask whether models with exogenous information structures are robust with respect to this endogenization. Any Nash equilibrium of the game with information acquisition induces a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547453
Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steady-states of a learning process because players may discover novel actions during play. In this sense, many games with unawareness are "self-destroying" as a player's representation of the game may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012509154