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This chapter of the Handbook of Game Theory (Vol. 3) provides an overview of the theory of Nash equilibrium and its …-enforcing theory of rational behavior in non-cooperative games. Given the assumption of independent behavior of the players, it follows … that a self-enforcing theory has to prescribe a Nash equilibrium, i.e., a strategy profile such that no player can gain by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024504
We study the phenomenon of tax evasion using a simple signaling model, in which the signal is taxpayer's reported income. The novelty of our approach lies in the way we define honesty. Specifically, we advocate the view that there are no absolutely honest taxpayers: all taxpayers may under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334842
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013206240
We study the phenomenon of tax evasion using a simple signaling model, in which the signal is taxpayer's reported income. The novelty of our approach lies in the way we define honesty. Specifically, we advocate the view that there are no absolutely honest taxpayers: all taxpayers may under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325501
We consider a continuous-time variant of the classical Economic Lot-Sizing (ELS) problem. In this model, the setup cost is a continuous function with lower bound $K_min 0$, the demand and holding costs are integrable functions of time and the replenishment decisions are not restricted to be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011094057
This paper introduces two set valued Nash equilibrium refinements that are a natural generalization of the concept of stable set of equilibria introduced in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) and satisfy all the properties defined in Mertens (1989). It also establishes a connection between Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011094061