We prove the existence of a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium in upper semicontinuous potential games, and we show that generic potential games possess pure-strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibria. We also establish a more powerful result: the set of maximizers of an...

We prove the existence of strategically stable sets of pure-strategy Nash equilibria (and hence the existence of pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibria) in potential games that admit an upper semicontinuous potential, and we show that generic potential games possess pure-strategy...

We prove the existence of a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium in upper semicontinuous potential games, and we show that generic potential games possess pure-strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibria. We also establish a more powerful result: the set of maximizers of an...

We prove the existence of strategically stable sets of pure-strategy Nash equilibria (and hence the existence of pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibria) in potential games that admit an upper semicontinuous potential, and we show that generic potential games possess pure-strategy...

A Nash equilibrium x of a normal-form game G is essential if any perturbation of G has an equilibrium close to x. Using payoff perturbations, we identify a new collection of games containing a dense, residual subset of games whose Nash equilibria are all essential. This collection subsumes the...

It is known that generic games within certain collections of infinite-action normal-form games have only essential equilibria. We point to a difficulty in showing that essential equilibria in generic games are (strictly) perfect, and we identify collections of games whose generic members have...

We prove the existence of a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium in upper semicontinuous potential games, and we show that generic potential games possess pure-strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibria. We also establish a more powerful result: the set of maximizers of an...