We experimentally investigate four allocation mechanisms - all based on the fair division approach, with varying bid elicitation methods and price rules - in terms of their allocation efficiency, distributional effects, and regularities in individual bidding behavior. In a repeated design, an...

We experimentally investigate four allocation mechanisms - all based on the fair division approach, with varying bid elicitation methods and price rules - in terms of their allocation efficiency, distributional effects, and regularities in individual bidding behavior. In a repeated design, an...

This paper compares two prominent empirical measures of individualrisk attitudes | the Holt and Laury (2002) lottery-choice task and the multi-itemquestionnaire advocated by Dohmen, Falk, Human, Schupp, Sunde and Wagner(forthcoming) | with respect to (a) their within-subject stability over time...

We investigate the influence of two widespread compensation schemes, individual piece-rates and team incentives, on participants' inclination to lie, by adapting the experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Lying turns out to be more pronounced under team incentives than under...

We investigate the influence of two widespread compensation schemes, individual piece-rates and team incentives, on participants' inclination to lie, by adapting the experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Lying turns out to be more pronounced under team incentives than under...

Using an online experiment with two distinct dishonesty games, we analyze how dishonesty in men and women is influenced by either thinking or learning about the dishonesty of others in a related, but different situation. Thinking is induced by eliciting a belief about others' dishonesty in a...

In a real-effort experiment, we investigate how the timing of discretionary bonuses affects the relationship between workers and managers. Average output is substantially higher if bonuses are paid in the middle rather than upfront or at the end, as workers increase first-period output to signal...

We study experimentally two-stage self-financing raffles, a novel class of charity fund-raising mechanisms in which participants can buy tickets in two stages. The proceeds of the first stage are used as the seed money for the second stage. The mechanisms differ by what happens to the tickets...