Similar Search Results

Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes: An Experiment

Puttermann, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - 2010

interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011310728

Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes: An experiment

Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - 2010

interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287731

Obedience to Rules with Mild Sanctions: The Roles of Peer Punishment and Voting

Chen, Josie I - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

help make such rules effective include the presence of informal sanctions by peers, and implementation through voting. I … after both implemented and randomly overridden voting. I find that informal sanctions strengthen the effect of formal ones …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107459

Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes: An Experiment

Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 2010

interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008546994

Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes: An Experiment

Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of … - 2010

interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009325734

Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes : an experiment

Puttermann, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - 2010

interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011344858

Communication and voting in heterogeneous committees : an experimental study

Thordal-Le Quement, Mark; Marcin, Isabel - 2016

We study experimentally the effectiveness of communication in common value committees exhibiting publicly known heterogeneous biases. We test models assuming respectively self-interested and strategic-, joint payoff-maximizing- and cognitively heterogeneous agents. These predict varying degrees...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444227

Voting on punishment systems within a heterogeneous group

Noussair, Charles N.; Tan, Fangfang - 2009

productivity. Nevertheless, only a minority of sessions converge to this system, indicating a tendency for the voting process to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276039

Give everybody a voice! The power of voting in a public goods experiment with externalities

Engel, Christoph; Rockenbach, Bettina - 2014

We study the effect of voting when insiders´ public goods provision may affect passive outsiders. Without voting …. Voting on the recommended contribution level enhances contributions if outsiders are unaffected and internalizes the negative … externality by lowering contributions when outsiders are negatively affected. Remarkably, voting does not increase contributions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010478914

Tipping versus Cooperating to Supply a Public Good

Barrett, Scott; Dannenberg, Astrid - 2015

In some important multi-player situations, such as efforts to supply a global public good, players can choose the game they want to play. In this paper we conduct an experimental test of the decision to choose between a tipping game, in which every player wants to contribute to the public good...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010500436