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multi-player coordination game with conflicting preferences. Network structure matters but the interaction between network … coordination and distribution of coordinated outcomes across networks. But increasing the communication length improves both … efficiency an equity of coordination. In all treatments, coordination is mostly explained by convergence in communication. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008587475
messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010418867
messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491446
messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010937981
messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011277296
some environments, cheap talk may help to achieve coordination. However, Aumann conjectures that, in a variant of the Stag … signal and then an action, there is impressive coordination: a 94% probability for the potentially efficient (but risky) play … issues in communication and coordination are discussed. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772240
Currently no refinement exists that successfully selects equilibria across a wider range of Cheap Talk games. We propose a generalization of refinements based on credible deviations, such as neologism proofness and announcement proofness. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325937
In this paper we attempt to compare theoretically and experimentally three models of strategic information transmission. In particular we focus on the models by Crawford & Sobel (1982), Lai (2010) and Ehses-Friedrich (2011). These three models differ in the information that the receiver...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369309
Currently no refinement exists that successfully selects equilibria across a wider range of Cheap Talk games. We propose a generalization of refinements based on credible deviations, such as neologism proofness and announcement proofness. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256700
This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information. We find that the poor quality of the information transmitted leads to a collapse of information markets. The reasons for this are surprising given the previous experimental results on cheap-talk games....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011872032