This study disentangles experimentally imitation, reinforcement, and reciprocity in repeated prisoners' dilemmas. We compare a simple situation in which players interact only with their neighbours (local interaction) with one where players interact with all members of the population (group...

We investigate and compare different approaches to derive strategies from observed data in spatial and spaceless prisoners' dilemmas experiments. We start with a model where players choose a fixed action that remains constant for all repetitions of a stage game. As an extension we then allow...

We examine the effect of unilateral and mutual partner selection in the context of prisoner's dilemmas experimentally. Subjects play simultaneously several finitely repeated two-person prisoner's dilemma games. We find that unilateral choice is the best system. It leads to low defection and...

In this paper we study learning and cooperation in repeated prisoners' dilemmas experiments. We compare interaction neighbourhoods of different sizes and structure and we observe choices under different information conditions and estimate parameters of a learning model. We test robustness of the...

We report the experimental results on a game with an outside option where induction contradicts with background induction based on a focal, risk dominant equilibrium. The latter procedure yields the equilibrium selected by Harsanyi and Selton's (1888) theory, which is hence here in contradiction...

This paper reports on RatDemo, an example program for the application of RatImage, the Research Assistance Toolbox for computerized human behavior experiments. The complete source code of this short experiment program is listed and briefly discussed. Since RatDemo combines several central...

This paper reports on RatImage, version 3.30. The extended features are presented. RatImage 3.30 is fully downward compatible to the first published version of the Research Assistance Toolbox for Computer-Aided Human Behaivor experiments, RatImage 3.10. This paper is an addendum to the manula of...

On the basis of experimental evidence reported in the literature the paper draws conclusions about the bounded rationality exhibited by human economic behaviour. Among the topics discussed are presentation effects caused by superficial analysis, strategic reasoning and strategy construction...

Essential characteristics of corruption are (1) a reciprocity relationship between briber and public official, (2) negative welfare effects, and (3) high penalties when discovered. We separate the influences of these factors in an experiment. In a two-player game reciprocation is economically...

In the economic literature on market competition, firms are often modeled as single decision makers and the internal organization of the firm is neglected (unitary player assumption). However, as the literature on strategic delegation suggests, one can not generally expect that the behavior of...