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This paper analyzes the impact on consumer prices of the size and biases of price comparison search engines. We develop several theoretical predictions, in the context of a model related to Burdett and Judd (1983) and Varian (1980), and test them experimentally. The data supports the model’s...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005622725
This article, analyzes the impact on consumer prices of the size and bias of price comparison search engines. we develop a model, related to Burdett and Judd (1983) and Varian (1980), and test experimentally several theoretical predictions. The experimental results confirm the model’s...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005115557
Abstract We analyze the impact on consumer prices of some information characteristics of price-comparison search platforms. An equilibrium model where vendors compete in prices and consumers do not observe prices, but can obtain price information through a search platform, is developed. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014618876
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In this paper we will give an overview of the more relevant results on the theoretical and experimental research related to public and private information dissemination and aggregation in asset markets, focusing mainly on the contemporaneous presence of public and private information and its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010406743
The theoretical communication model by Gossner et al. (2006) (GHN henceforth) based on the matching pennies game has recently been implemented by García-Gallego et al. (2013) (GHR henceforth) in the lab, emphasizing the transmission of information among players with aligned incentives. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011262839
Based on Gossner, Hernández and Neyman’s (2006) 3-player game (hereafter GHN) we analyze communication efficiency in the lab. In that game, player 1 represents random nature an i.i.d. procedure, player 2 is a fully informed player (wiser), and player 3 is the less informed player (agent). The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773000