This paper proposes a structural non-equilibrium model of initial responses to incomplete-information games based on "level-k" thinking, which describes behavior in many experiments with complete-information games. We derive the model's implications in first- and second-price auctions with...

Empirically determining whether wage differentials arise because of discrimination is extremely difficult, and distinguishing between different theories of discrimination is harder still. This paper exploits a number of unique features of a high-stakes television game show to determine which...

"Hide-and-Seek" games are zero-sum two-person games in which one player wins by matching the other's decision and the other wins by mismatching. Although such games are often played on cultural or geographic "landscapes" that frame decisions non-neutrally, equilibrium ignores such framing. This...

Given the tournament-style structure of many aspects of the labor market, one potentially powerful explanation for gender differences in pay and promotion is that men and women respond differently to competitive environments. We examine data from the high-stakes television game show The Weakest...