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Auctioning public goods to groups of aghents
ALBOTH, Dirk; LERNER, Anat; SHALEV, Jonathan - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1997
A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to at most one of a number of groups of agents. The groups may have non-empty intersections. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043652
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Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods
ALBOTH, Dirk; LERNER, Anat; SHALEV, Jonathan - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1998
A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to a group of agents. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides the good to the group, only if the sum of their bids exceeds a reserve...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008302
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Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms
Jehiel, Philippe; Moldovanu, Benny - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
We study the effects of allocative and informational externalities in (multi-object) auctions and related mechanisms …. Such externalities naturally arise in models that embed auctions in larger economic contexts. In particular, they appear …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792072
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Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods
Alboth, Dirk; Lerner, Anat; Shalev, Jonathan - EconWPA - 1997
A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to a group of agents. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides the good to the group, only if the sum of their bids exceeds a reserve...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118539
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Horizontal mergers with synergies: first-price vs. profit-share auction
Ding, Wei; Fan, Cuihong; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - 2010
of merging with a takeover target. Two auction rules are considered: standard first-price and profit-share auctions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333759
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Bidding among Friends and Enemies
Ettinger, David - 2003
We consider an auction setting in which potential buyers, even if they fail to obtain the good, care about the price paid by the winner. We study the impact of these price-externalities on the first-price auction and the second-price auction in a symmetric information framework. First, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325066
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Bidding among Friends and Enemies
Ettinger, David - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003
We consider an auction setting in which potential buyers, even if they fail to obtain the good, care about the price paid by the winner. We study the impact of these price-externalities on the first-price auction and the second-price auction in a symmetric information framework. First, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423117
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Bidding among friends and enemies with symmetric information
Ettinger, David - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2010
We consider an auction setting, in a symmetric information framework, in which bidders, even if they fail to obtain the good, care about the price paid by the winner. We prove that the outcome of the first-price auction is not affected by identity-independent price externalities, while the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011166430
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Designing Auctions in R&D: Optimal Licensing of an Innovation
Brocas, Isabelle - In: Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy 6 (2006) 1, pp. 1533-1533
obtained, auctions licenses to a pool of producers. Each producer has a private valuation for the license and suffers a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005751302
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An optimal auction with identity-dependent externalities
Aseff, Jorge; Chade, Hector - Econometric Society - 2004
We analyze the problem of a seller who has multiple units of a good and faces a set of buyers with unit demands, private information, and identity-dependent externalities. We derive the seller's optimal mechanism and characterize its main properties. As an application of the model, we consider...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005699600