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Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Incomplete Information.
Abreu, D.; Matsushima, H. - Hoover Institution on War Revolution & Peace, Stanford … - 1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005475085
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A RESPECTIVE ON RENEGOTIATION IN REPEATED GAMES.
ABREU, D.; PEARCE, D. - Hoover Institution on War Revolution & Peace, Stanford … - 1989
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005625711
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Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition.
Abreu, D.; Dutta, P.K.; Smith, L. - Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of … - 1992
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574408
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The Folk Theorem for Discounted Repeated Games: A New Condition.
Abreu, D.; Dutta, P.K. - Department of Economics, School of Arts and Sciences - 1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005687461
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The Folk Theorem for Discounted Repeated Games: A New Condition.
Abreu, D.; Dutta, P. - University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research … - 1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005698154
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MONOTONICITY IN GAMES THAT EXHAUST GAINS TO SCALE.
SCOTCHMER, S.; WOODERS, M.H. - Hoover Institution on War Revolution & Peace, Stanford … - 1989
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005776152
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An Approach to Equilibrium Selection.
Matsui, A.; Matsuyama, K. - Hoover Institution on War Revolution & Peace, Stanford … - 1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005776157
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STARTEGIC BARGAINING MODELS AND INTERPRETATION ON STRIKE DATA.
KENNAM, J.; WILSON, R. - Hoover Institution on War Revolution & Peace, Stanford … - 1988
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005625741