To explain why pre-play communication increases cooperation in games,one refers to a) strategic causes such as efficient communication or reputationeffects, and b) changes in the utilities due to social processes. Hithertoexperimental support for both explanations is mixed and confounded....

A 4-person quota game is analyzed and discussed, in which players find it beneficial to pay others, in order to encourage favorable coalition structure.

With cheap talk, more can be achieved by long conversations than by a single message - even when one side is strictly better informed than the other.

n overview of the landmark contributions of Robert J. Aumann, winner of the 2005 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences.

This paper revisits and extends the experiment on the solidarity gameby Selten and Ockenfels (1998). We replicate the basic design of the solidaritygame and extend it in order to test the robustness of the fixed totalsacrifice' effect and the applied strategy method. Our results only...

This paper revisits and extends the experiment on the solidarity game by Selten and Ockenfels (1998). We replicate the basic design of the solidarity game and extend it in order to t test the robustness of the ‘fixed total sacrifice’ effect and the applied strategy method. Our results only...