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An Endogenous Group Formation Theory of Co-operative Networks: The Economics of La Lega and Mondrag.n

Joshi, Sumit; Smith, Stephen C. - World Institute for Development Economic Research … - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005059993

Kovářík, Jaromír; Mengel, Friederike; Romero, J. Gabriel - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 9 (2018) 1, pp. 85-139

opportunities to identify learning rules, since on networks (compared to, e.g., random matching) more rules differ in terms of their …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011884406

Learning in network games

Kovářík, Jaromír; Mengel, Friederike; Romero, J. Gabriel - In: Quantitative Economics 9 (2018) 1, pp. 85-139

opportunities to identify learning rules, since on networks (compared to, e.g., random matching) more rules differ in terms of their …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011995513

Learning in Network Games

Romero, José Gabriel; Kovarik, Jaromir; Mengel, Friederike - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, … - 2012

games offer new opportunities to identify learning rules, since on networks (compared to e.g. random matching) more rules …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145661

Under-connected and over-connected networks

Buechel, Berno; Hellmann, Tim - Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2008

Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71 …, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between … results that relate situations of positive externalities with stable networks that cannot be "too dense" in a well …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005002279

Chapter 62 Game theory and experimental gaming

Shubik, Martin - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 2327-2351). 2002

This is a survey and discussion of work covering both formal game theory and experimental gaming prior to 1991. It is a useful preliminary introduction to the considerable change and emphasis which has taken place since that time where dynamics, learning, and local optimization have challenged...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024483

International environmental agreements with uncertainty, learning and risk aversion

Finus, Michael; Pintassilgo, Pedro; Ulph, Alistair - 2014

This paper analyses the formation of international environmental agreements (IEAs) under uncertainty, focusing on the role of learning and risk aversion. It bridges two strands of literature: one focused on the role learning for the success of IEA formation when countries are risk neutral and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010234539

Spurious middlemen in corrupt transactions

Bayar, Güzin - 2014

To solve the corruption problem, its root causes should first be diagnosed and factors supporting it should be determined. One of the important facilitators of corrupt transactions are intermediaries, who make corrupt dealings less risky, thereby increasing corruption. Even worse, there are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365119

Vertical undbundling, the coordination of investment, and network pricing

Brunekreeft, Gert; Friedrichsen, Nele - 2010

This paper provides a formal analysis on the investment coordination problem in a vertically separated electricity supply industry, although the analysis may apply also to other network industries. In an electric- ity system, the investment decisions of network and power plants need to be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010421957

Spurious middlemen in corrupt transactions

Bayar, Güzin - 2014

The first step in solving the problem of corruption lies in diagnosing its root causes and determining the underlying factors. One of the most important facilitators of corrupt transactions is intermediaries who make corrupt dealings less risky, thereby increasing corruption. Even worse, there...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010436816