Showing 1 - 9 of 9
understandable by humans. For instance the strategies for the strongest poker agents are represented as massive binary files. In many …. For example, a human poker player or military leader may not have access to large precomputed tables when making real …-time strategic decisions. We study poker games where private information distributions can be arbitrary (i.e., players are dealt …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852715
Differences in players' skill are important determinants of relative player success in most real games such as poker … differences among players. This paper uses a simplified version of stud poker to better understand the concept of differential …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009191505
understandable by humans. For instance the strategies for the strongest poker agents are represented as massive binary files. In many …. For example, a human poker player or military leader may not have access to large precomputed tables when making real …-time strategic decisions. We study poker games where private information distributions can be arbitrary (i.e., players are dealt …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771259
Risk aversion in game theory is usually modeled using expected utility, which was criticized early on, leading to an extensive literature on generalized expected utility. In this paper we are the first to apply μ-σ theory to the analysis of (static) games. μ-σ theory is widely...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200068
We examine whether the predictions of minimax in zero-sum games holds under highly incentivized conditions with highly informed informed decision makers. We examine data from 3455 National Football League (NFL) games from the 2000 season through the 2012 season. We categorize every relevant play...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113826
In a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, changing one player's payoffs affects only the other player's equilibrium strategy mix. This `Payoff Irrelevance Proposition' (PIP) appears to undercut the main foundations of economic policy analysis since, allegedly, equilibrium behavior will not respond...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777864
This paper reports an experiment to determine whether subjects will learn to stop using a strictly dominated strategy that can be an above average reply. It is difficult to find an experimental design that eliminates the play of the strictly dominated strategy completely. The least effective...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005711685
This paper offers the generalization that competitive promotions are mixed strategies. First an empirical regularity is established that promotions are independent across competitors. This regularity is then elaborated on in the context of a promotion game. The promotion game is linked to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009144094
Risk aversion in game theory is usually modeled using expected utility, which was criticized early on, leading to an extensive literature on generalized expected utility. In this paper we are the first to apply μ-σ theory to the analysis of (static) games. μ-σ theory is widely accepted in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432539