Showing 1 - 10 of 100
In this paper we study competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in a cooperative n-person transferable utility (TU) game from the viewpoint of general equilibrium theory.For any given game, we construct a competitive exchange coalition production economy corresponding to the game....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091142
In this paper we generalize the concept of a non-transferable utility game by introducing the concept of a socially structured game.A socially structured game is given by a set of players, a possibly empty collection of internal organizations on any subset of players, for any internal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091448
We consider cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), in which we allow for a social structure on the set of players, for instance a hierarchical ordering or a dominance relation.The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game, being the set of payoffs to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091453
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011086807
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011087082
In this paper we characterize the class of games for which the core coincides with the core cover (compromise stable games).Moreover we will develop an easy explicit formula for the nucleolus for this class of games, using an approach based on bankruptcy problems.Also the class of convex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090315
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090327
This study considers a simple newsvendor situation that consists of n retailers, all selling the same item with common purchasing costs and common selling prices.Groups of retailers might increase their expected joint profit by inventory centralization, which means that they make a joint order...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090367
We experimentally investigate the nature of strategic interaction in a 2-player game.Player 1may take x Dutch guilders (f x) and end the game (player 2 then gets f 0), or let player 2 split f 20 between the players. x is a treatment variable taking values of f 4, 7, 10, 13, and 16.We find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090378
Informationally Robust Equilibria (IRE) are introduced in Robson (1994) as a refinement of Nash equilibria for e.g. bimatrix games, i.e. mixed extensions of two person finite games.Similar to the concept of perfect equilibria, basically the idea is that an IRE is a limit of some sequence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090474