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Informationally Robust Equilibria (IRE) are introduced in Robson (1994) as a refinement of Nash equilibria for e.g. bimatrix games, i.e. mixed extensions of two person finite games.Similar to the concept of perfect equilibria, basically the idea is that an IRE is a limit of some sequence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090474
We study boundedly rational players in an interactive situation. Each player follows a simple choice procedure in which he reacts optimally against a combination of actions of his opponents drawn at random from the distribution generated by a player's beliefs. By imposing a consistency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091180
Finite potential games have Nash equilibria in pure strategies.This note provides some results on the existence of equilibria or approximate equilibria if some players have infinite sets of strategies.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091983
In this paper the structure of the set of equilibria for two person multicriteria games is analysed. It turns out that the classical result for the set of equilibria for bimatrix games, that it is a finite union of polytopes, is only valid for multicriteria games if one of the players only has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091997
The function that assigns to each matrix game (i.e., the mixed extension of a finite zero-sum two-player game) its value is axiomatized by a number of intuitive properties.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092657
In this paper reasonable payoff intervals for players in a game in partition function form (p.f.f.game) are introduced and used to define the notion of compromisable p.f.f. game.For a compromisable p.f.f. game a compromise value is defined for which an axiomatic characterization is provided.Also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090485
Most of the known efficient algorithms designed to compute the nucleolus for special classes of balanced games are based on two facts: (i) in any balanced game, the coalitions which actually determine the nucleolus are essential; and (ii) all essential coalitions in any of the games in the class...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090844
In this paper the egalitarian solution for convex cooperative fuzzy games is introduced.The classical Dutta-Ray algorithm for finding the constrained egalitarian solution for convex crisp games is adjusted to provide the egalitarian solution of a convex fuzzy game.This adjusted algorithm is also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090953
In this paper we study the endogenous formation of cooperation structures or communication graphs between players in a superadditive TU game. For each cooperation structure that is formed, the payoffs to the players are determined by an exogenously given solution. We model the process of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091161
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091479