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We investigate the equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation that are based on individual actions only.Our approach is grounded in three simple and realistic principles: (1) Link formation should be a binary process of consent.(2) Link formation should be costly.(3) The class of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090903
We consider game theoretic models of social network formation.In this paper we limit our investigation to game theoretic models of network formation that are based on individual actions only.Our approach is based on three simple and realistic principles: (1) Link formation is a binary process of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091118
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005660489
In this paper we characterize the class of games for which the core coincides with the core cover (compromise stable games).Moreover we will develop an easy explicit formula for the nucleolus for this class of games, using an approach based on bankruptcy problems.Also the class of convex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090315
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This study considers a simple newsvendor situation that consists of n retailers, all selling the same item with common purchasing costs and common selling prices.Groups of retailers might increase their expected joint profit by inventory centralization, which means that they make a joint order...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090367
We experimentally investigate the nature of strategic interaction in a 2-player game.Player 1may take x Dutch guilders (f x) and end the game (player 2 then gets f 0), or let player 2 split f 20 between the players. x is a treatment variable taking values of f 4, 7, 10, 13, and 16.We find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090378
Informationally Robust Equilibria (IRE) are introduced in Robson (1994) as a refinement of Nash equilibria for e.g. bimatrix games, i.e. mixed extensions of two person finite games.Similar to the concept of perfect equilibria, basically the idea is that an IRE is a limit of some sequence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090474
In this paper reasonable payoff intervals for players in a game in partition function form (p.f.f.game) are introduced and used to define the notion of compromisable p.f.f. game.For a compromisable p.f.f. game a compromise value is defined for which an axiomatic characterization is provided.Also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090485
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