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Appropriating the commons : a theoretical explanation

Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - 2001

In this paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398786

A description-experience gap in social interactions : information about interdependence and its effects on cooperation

Martin, Jolie M.; Gonzalez, Cleotilde; Juvina, Ion; … - In: Journal of behavioral decision making 27 (2014) 4, pp. 349-362

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010517804

The deterrence effects of gun laws in games with asymmetric skills and information

Oliveira, Cristiano; Balbinotto Neto, Giácomo - In: Review of law and economics : publ. in cooperation with … 11 (2015) 3, pp. 435-452

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011381813

Two against one : deterrence in the triad

Zagare, Frank C. - In: Peace economics, peace science and public policy 30 (2024) 1, pp. 1-25

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014526554

Prospects of deterrence : deterrence theory, representation and evidence

Sörenson, Karl - In: Defence and peace economics 35 (2024) 2, pp. 145-159

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014514942

Cooperation and club goods : fisheries management in the spirit of Elinor Ostrom

Grønbæk Kronbak, Lone; Lindroos, Marko; Munro, Gordon R. - In: Marine resource economics 40 (2025) 1, pp. 65-79

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015329964

Bielefeld Game Theory and Indiana Institutional Analysis : Elinor Ostrom and Theories of Common-Pool Resources

Erickson, Paul - In: History of political economy 56 (2024) 3, pp. 537-560

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015061754

Learning in network games

Kovářík, Jaromír; Mengel, Friederike; Romero, J. Gabriel - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 9 (2018) 1, pp. 85-139

opportunities to identify learning rules, since on networks (compared to, e.g., random matching) more rules differ in terms of their …. Monitoring information requests turns out to be crucial, as estimates based on choices alone show substantial biases. We also …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011884406

Fairness, Public Good, and Emotional Aspects of Punishment Behavior

Abbink, K.; Sadrieh, A.; Zamir, S. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2002

We report an experiment on two treatments of an ultimatum minigame.In one treatment, responders' reactions are hidden … attributed to responders' provision of a public good: Punishment creates a group reputation for being "tough" and effectively …-informed proposers, the hypothesis of responders' enjoyment of overt punishment is not supported. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092134

Does Punishment Matter? A Refinement of the Inspection Game

Pradiptyo, Rimawan - In: Review of Law & Economics 3 (2007) 2, pp. 2-2

game. In contrast to Tsebelis' propositions, we find that the severity of punishment may affect the offending behavior of … incentives to those who do not have a criminal history. The impact of increasing the severity of punishment on reducing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005246142