In this paper the structure of the set of equilibria for two person multicriteria games is analysed. It turns out that the classical result for the set of equilibria for bimatrix games, that it is a finite union of polytopes, is only valid for multicriteria games if one of the players only has...

Informationally Robust Equilibria (IRE) are introduced in Robson (1994) as a refinement of Nash equilibria for e.g. bimatrix games, i.e. mixed extensions of two person finite games.Similar to the concept of perfect equilibria, basically the idea is that an IRE is a limit of some sequence of...

This note characterizes ordinal potential games by the absence of weak improvement cycles and an order condition on the strategy space.This order condition is automatically satisfied if the strategy space is countable.

We study boundedly rational players in an interactive situation. Each player follows a simple choice procedure in which he reacts optimally against a combination of actions of his opponents drawn at random from the distribution generated by a player's beliefs. By imposing a consistency...

Finite potential games have Nash equilibria in pure strategies.This note provides some results on the existence of equilibria or approximate equilibria if some players have infinite sets of strategies.

The function that assigns to each matrix game (i.e., the mixed extension of a finite zero-sum two-player game) its value is axiomatized by a number of intuitive properties.

We define an algebro-topological concept of essential map and we use it to prove several results in the theory of general equilibrium and nash equilibrium refinement.

AMS classification: 90D12

AMS classification: 90D12

Bayesian equilibria are characterized by means of consistency and one-person rationality in combination with non-emptiness or converse consistency. Moreover, strong and coalition-proof Bayesian equilibria of extended Bayesian games are introduced and it is seen that these notions can be...