We integrate individual power in groups into general equilibrium models. The relationship between group formation, resource allocation, and the power of specific individuals or particular sociological groups is investigated. We introduce, via an illustrative example, three appealing concepts of...

We integrate individual power in groups into general equilibrium models with endogenous group formation. We distinguish between formal power (the say in group decisions) and real power (utility gain from being in groups). Their values will be determined as part of the equilibrium. We find that...

When formal insurance is unavailable, mutual insurance among households can serve as an alternative. This paper analyzes a game between economic agents facing uncertainty and maximizing discounted utility without enforceable contracts or access to capital markets. While autarky is always a...

We propose a formal concept of the power of voice in the context of a simple model where individuals form groups and trade in competitive markets. Individuals use outside options in two different ways. Actual outside options reflect the possibility to exit or to join other existing groups....

We We integrate individual power in groups into general equilibrium models. The relationship between group formation, resource allocation, and the power of specific individuals or particular sociological groups is investigated. We introduce, via an illustrative example, three appealing concepts...

When formal insurance is unavailable, mutual insurance among households can serve as an alternative. This paper analyzes a game between economic agents facing uncertainty and maximizing discounted utility without enforceable contracts or access to capital markets. While autarky is always a...

We integrate individual power in groups into general equilibrium models. The relationship between group formation, resource allocation, and the power of specific individuals or particular sociological groups is investigated. We introduce, via an illustrative example, three appealing concepts of...

We propose a formal concept of the power of voice in the context of a simple model where individuals form groups and trade in competitive markets. Individuals use outside options in two different ways. Actual outside options reflect the possibility to exit or to join other existing groups....

We present a variant of a general equilibrium model with group formation to study how changes of non-consumptive beneï¬ts from group formation impact on the well-being of group members. We identify a human relations paradox: Positive externalities increase, but none of the group members gains...

We propose a formal concept of the power of voice in the context of a simple model where individuals form groups and trade in competitive markets. Individuals use outside options in two different ways. Actual outside options reflect the possibility to exit or to join other existing groups....