Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 773
Cover Image
Agendas in legislative decision-making
Horan, Sean - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 1, pp. 235-274
Despite the wide variety of agendas used in legislative settings, the literature on sophisticated voting has focused on two formats, the so-called Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas. In the current paper, I introduce a broad class of agendas whose defining structural features,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013188992
Cover Image
Agendas in legislative decision-making
Horan, Sean - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 1, pp. 235-274
Despite the wide variety of agendas used in legislative settings, the literature on sophisticated voting has focused on two formats, the so-called Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas. In the current paper, I introduce a broad class of agendas whose defining structural features,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415641
Cover Image
The not-so-secret-agent: Professional monitors, hierarchies and implementation
Baliga, Sandeep - In: Review of Economic Design 7 (2002) 1, pp. 17-26
implementation of the organization's objectives. We show that the introduction of a professional monitor (e.g. auditor, regulator …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370566
Cover Image
Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu-Hurwicz equilibrium
Haake, Claus-Jochen; Trockel, Walter - 2021
and Sonnenschein (1975) that also generalizes the dcmechanism of Koray and Yildiz (2018) which relates implementation via … mechanisms with implementation via rights structures as introduced by Sertel (2001). In the second part we apply and illustrate … provide in a socio-legal system based on Nash's demand game an implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in Debreu …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012606400
Cover Image
Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments
Healy, Paul J.; Mathevet, Laurent - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 3, pp. 609-661
We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599472
Cover Image
Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments
Healy, Paul J.; Mathevet, Laurent - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 3
We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009246638
Cover Image
Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments
Healy, Paul J.; Mathevet, Laurent - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 3, pp. 609-661
We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689095
Cover Image
Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu-Hurwicz equilibrium
Haake, Claus-Jochen; Trockel, Walter - 2021 - This version: April 05, 2021
and Sonnenschein (1975) that also generalizes the dcmechanism of Koray and Yildiz (2018) which relates implementation via … mechanisms with implementation via rights structures as introduced by Sertel (2001). In the second part we apply and illustrate … provide in a socio-legal system based on Nash's demand game an implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in Debreu …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012499554
Cover Image
Renegotiation-proof mechanism design
Neeman, Zvika; Pavlov, Gregory - 2010
We study a mechanism design problem under the assumption that renegotiation cannot be prevented. We investigate what kind of equilibria of which mechanisms are renegotiation-proof under a variety of renegotiation procedures, and which social choice functions can be implemented in a way that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291988
Cover Image
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium
Mezzetti, Claudio; Renou, Ludovic - Department of Economics, Leicester University - 2009
profile. This definition generalizes Maskin’s definition of Nash implementation in that it does not require each optimal … Maskin’s monotonicity, is necessary for implementation. We provide sufficient conditions for implementation and show that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004961262