In this paper, we suggest that inefficiency may be an indirect, on-the-job compensation to agents in an organization. We show how to use actual production data to reveal the trade-offs between different inefficiencies (slacks). Moreover, we discuss how to use this to improve productivity...

We investigate the unique contractual arrangement between a large Ethiopian sugar factory and its adjacent outgrower associations. The only significant difference between the sugarcane production on the factory-operated sugarcane plantation and on the outgrower-operated plots is the remuneration...

This paper analyzes a contract between farmers and a large company in the Danish food industry, Danisco Foods. Production of green peas requires a very accurate coordination, which is obtained through centralized decision-making. The contract is based on a tournament system providing risk...

We consider how to organize the processing and marketing of an agricultural product when farming costs are known only by the individual farmers. We show that when marginal costs are un-correlated and the market for final goods is competitive, the socially optimal production levels may be...