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A Nobel Prize for property rights theory
Holden, Richard T. - In: Games 8 (2017) 1, pp. 1-3
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011620749
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The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation : an empirical investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard T.; … - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo’s subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010506318
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The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation : an empirical investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard T.; … - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010510004
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The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; … - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010531676
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The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; … - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo’s subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010531776
Cover Image
A Nobel Prize for property rights theory
Holden, Richard - In: Games 8 (2017) 1, pp. 1-3
This article provides a brief overview of the Property-Rights Theory of the firm, pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), and situates the theory in other literatures.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709910
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The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; … - CESifo - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo’s subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257671
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The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011265296
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The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation: an empirical investigation
Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; Wilkening, Tom; Aghion, … - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011220298