In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria--equilibria that are not in pure strategies--are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics.

In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria--equilibria that are not in pure strategies--are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics.

Consumption is partly a social activity, yet most studies of consumer behavior treat households in isolation. We investigate familial relationships in consumption patterns using a sample of parents and their children from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We find a positive and statistically...

Workers typically perform a variety jobs over the course of their careers in firms. These jobs differ in the skills they require and, thus, may convey different amounts of information about worker ability. In this paper, we develop a theory of learning and job design, and empirically test this...

We follow Walker and Wooders’(2001) empirical analysis to collect and study a broader data set in tennis, including male, female and junior matches. We find that there is mixed evidence in support of the minimax hypothesis. Granted, the plays in our data pass all the tests in Walker and...

Central banks behave purposefully when they set monetary policy, basing their decisions upon the data that is available and upon their understanding of the economy. At the same time, policy decisions affect economic outcomes, and the likelihood of observing a given state of the world. This paper...

This paper examines the welfare implications of managing Q with inflation targeting by monetary authorities who have to "learn" the laws of motion for both inflation and the rate of growth of Q. Our results show that the Central Bank can achieve great success in reducing the volatility of GDP...

This paper analyzes a stochastic model of evolution in normal form games. The long-run behavior of individuals in this model is investigated in the limit where mutation rates tend to zero, while the expected number of mutations, and hence population sizes, tend to infinity. It is shown that...