We study the effects of monetary shocks in a model of state-dependent price and wage adjustment based on "control costs". Suppliers of retail goods and of labor are both monopolistic competitors that face idiosyncratic productivity shocks and nominal rigidities. Stickiness arises because precise...

We study the effects of monetary shocks in a model of state-dependent price and wage adjustment based on "control costs". Suppliers of retail goods and of labor are both monopolistic competitors that face idiosyncratic productivity shocks and nominal rigidities. Stickiness arises because precise...

This paper proposes a model in which retail prices are sticky even though firms can always change their prices at zero cost. Instead of imposing a "menu cost", we assume that more precise decisions are more costly. In equilibrium, firms optimally make some errors in price-setting, thus...

We model retail price stickiness as the result of errors due to costly decision-making. Under our assumed cost function for the precision of choice, the timing of price adjustments and the prices firms set are both logit random variables. Errors in the prices firms set help explain micro...

We model retail price stickiness as the result of errors due to costly decision-making. Under our assumed cost function for the precision of choice, the timing of price adjustments and the prices firms set are both logit random variables. Errors in the prices firms set help explain micro...

This paper proposes two models in which price stickiness arises endogenously even though fi rms are free to change their prices at zero physical cost. Firms are subject to idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, and they also face a risk of making errors when they set their prices. In our fi rst...

We propose a near-rational model of retail price adjustment consistent with microeconomic and macroeconomic evidence on price dynamics. Our framework is based on the idea that avoiding errors in decision making is costly. Given our assumed cost function for error avoidance, the timing of...