We consider two-sided many-to-many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations in centralized markets that employ (pairwise) stable mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank...

We consider two-sided many-to-many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations in centralized markets that employ (pairwise) stable mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank...

We consider two-sided many-to-many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations in centralized markets that employ (pairwise) stable mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank...

This paper surveys gender wage gaps in Colombia from 1994 to 2006, using matchingcomparisons to examine the extent to which individuals with similar human capitalcharacteristics earn different wages. Three sub-periods are considered: 1994-1998; 2000-2001; and 2002- 2006. The gaps dropped from the first...

This paper surveys gender wage gaps in Colombia from 1994 to 2006, using matchingcomparisons to examine the extent to which individuals with similar human capitalcharacteristics earn different wages. Three sub-periods are considered: 1994-1998; 2000-2001; and 2002- 2006. The gaps dropped from the first...