Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 45
Cover Image
Stability in repeated matching markets
Liu, Ce - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 4, pp. 1711-1757
This paper develops a framework for studying repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale-Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived players (firms) match with a new generation of short-lived players (workers) in every period. I define history-dependent and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537010
Cover Image
Matching with Couples: a Multidisciplinary Survey
Biró, Péter; Klijn, Flip - 2011
This survey deals with two-sided matching markets where one set of agents (workers/residents) has to be matched with another set of agents (firms/hospitals). We first give a short overview of a selection of classical results. Then, we review recent contributions to a complex and representative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494484
Cover Image
Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: Acyclicity and dropping strategies
Tello, Benjamín - 2018
We consider the problem of matching a set of medical students to a set of medical residency positions (hospitals) under the assumption that hospitals' preferences over groups of students are responsive. In this context, we study the preference revelation game induced by the student proposing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012057065
Cover Image
Paying to Match: Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions
Agranov, Marina; Dianat, Ahrash; Samuelson, Larry; … - 2021
markets often culminate in efficient matchings, stability is more elusive, reflecting the difficulty of arranging attendant … transfers. Second, incomplete information and submodularity present hurdles to efficiency and especially stability; their … combination drastically diminishes stability’s likelihood. Third, matchings form “from the top down” in complete …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012492966
Cover Image
Ties matter: improving efficiency in course allocation by introducing ties
Chen, Ning; Li, Mengling - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
We study the course allocation system at Nanyang Technological University, where students submit strict preferences for courses and courses have implicit preferences for students. This formulates a many-to-many matching problem. We show the inefficiencies of the current mechanism and propose new...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107943
Cover Image
Matching with Quorums
Monte, Daniel; Tumennasan, Norovsambuu - School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus - 2012
We study the problem of allocating workers to different projects in which each project requires having a minimum number of workers assigned to it or else it does not open. We show that the well-known serial dictatorship mechanism is neither strategy-proof nor Pareto efficient. Thus, we propose...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011158458
Cover Image
On the Exhaustiveness of Truncation and Dropping Strategies in Many-to-Many Matching Markets
Jaramillo, Paula; Kay, Cagatay; Klijn, Flip - UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE - 2012
We consider two-sided many-to-many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations in centralized markets that employ (pairwise) stable mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010828284
Cover Image
On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets
Jaramillo, Paula; Cagatay, Kagi; Klijn, Flip - UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO - 2012
We consider two-sided many-to-many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations in centralized markets that employ (pairwise) stable mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010763245
Cover Image
A Many-to-Many "Rural Hospital Theorem"
Klijn, Flip; Yazici, Ayse - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014
We show that the full version of the so-called "rural hospital theorem" generalizes to many-to-many matching problems where agents on both sides of the problem have substitutable and weakly separable preferences. We reinforce our result by showing that when agents' preferences satisfy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851401
Cover Image
Roth, Alvin(born 1951)
Kojima, Fuhito - Palgrave Macmillan
Roth is the major force in creating a vibrant field of matching theory and its application to market design. In doing so, he has discovered many properties of the stable matching problem (especially from the strategic viewpoint of game theory), studied real-life cases to test the relevance of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010861117