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Afacan, Mustafa Oðuz; Bó, Inácio Guerberoff Lanari; … - 2018

, fairness, and implementation impossibilities. Despite that, we present two classes of mechanisms that maximize assignments. The …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011793994

Economic engineering and the design of matching markets : the contributions of Alvin E. Roth

Jackson, Matthew O. - In: The Scandinavian journal of economics 115 (2013) 3, pp. 619-639

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009778347

Broadening the market design approach to school choice

Cantillon, Estelle - In: Oxford review of economic policy 33 (2017) 4, pp. 613-634

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011952540

School choice and loss aversion

Meisner, Vincent; Wangenheim, Jonas von - 2021

Evidence suggests that participants in direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanisms (DA) play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal equilibria in DA. We find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012698801

Report-dependent utility and strategy-proofness

Meisner, Vincent - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 69 (2023) 5, pp. 2733-2745

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014305432

Report-dependent utility and strategy-proofness

Meisner, Vincent - 2021

Despite the truthful dominant strategy, participants in strategy-proof me- chanisms submit manipulated preferences. In our model, participants dislike rejections and enjoy the confirmation from getting what they declared most desirable. Formally, the payoff from a match decreases in its position...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648382

Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent

Chen, Yiqiu; Möller, Markus - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 2, pp. 635-666

Efficiency Adjusted Deferred Acceptance Rule (EDA) is a promising candidate mechanism for a public school assignment. A … strategy-proofness and was introduced by Fernandez (2020). We also show that there is no efficient matching rule that weakly … Pareto dominates a stable matching rule and is regret-free truth-telling. Note that the original version of EDA by Kesten …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014576700

An invitation to market design

Kominers, Scott Duke; Teytelboym, Alexander; Crawford, … - In: Oxford review of economic policy 33 (2017) 4, pp. 541-571

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011952524

Effcient and incentive-compatible liver exchange

Ergin, Haluk İ.; Sönmez, Tayfun; Ünver, M. Utku - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011891038

Stability in large matching markets with complementarities

Ashlagi, Itai; Braverman, Mark; Hassidim, Avinatan - In: Operations research 62 (2014) 4, pp. 713-732

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010403174