We consider the problem of (re)allocating the total endowment of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences and initial endowments. We propose an extension of the so-called uniform rule and show that it is the unique rule satisfying strategy-proofness, Pareto...

By virtue of the Kemeny distance strategy-proofness of preference rules is defined. It is shown that a preference rule, which assigns a complete relation to every profile of complete relations is non-imposed and strategy-proof if and only if it is pairwise voting in committees. So,...

An impossibility theorem for preference aggretating rules is discussed. In this theorem no transitivity condition or acyclicity condition is imposed on the preferences: neither on the individual level nor on the aggregated level. Under the conditions that aggregation is non-dictatorial,...

The strong sequential core for two-stage economies with a possibly incomplete set of assets in period zero and trade in commodities in period one consists of those goods allocations that are in the classical core and moreover, after realization of the state of nature, in the core of the economy...

The goal of this paper is twofold. Firstly a short proof of the unicity of the reduced form of a normal form game is provided, using a technique to reduce a game originally introduced by Mertens. Secondly a direct combinatorial-geometric interpretation of the reduced form is described. This...

An impossibility theorem for preference aggretating rules is discussed. In this theorem no transitivity condition or acyclicity condition is imposed on the preferences: neither on the individual level nor on the aggregated level. Under the conditions that aggregation is non-dictatorial,...

This paper is concerned with the question of how to define the core when cooperation takes place in a dynamic setting. The focus is on dynamic cooperative games in which the players face a finite sequence of exogenously specified TU-games. Three different core concepts are presented: the...

This paper is the first to introduce an algorithm to compute stationary equilibria in stochastic games, and shows convergence of the algorithm for almost all such games. Moreover, since in general the number of stationary equilibria is overwhelming, we pay attention to the issue of equilibrium...

In this paper we prove the following fixed point theorem. Consider a non-empty bounded polyhedron P and a function ƒ : P → P such that for every x є P for which ƒ (x) ≠ x there exists δ 0 such that for all y, z є B (x, δ) ∩ P it holds that (ƒ(y)-y)2 (ƒ(z)-z) ≤ 0, where B (x, δ)...

We consider a robotic flowshop model in which a single robot is responsible for the transportation of parts between machines and the amount of time that a part spends on a machine must be comprised in some predefined interval. The objective is to find a feasible schedule with minimal cycle time....