We show that a solution to the problem of mechanism selection by an informed principal exists in a large class of environments with “generalized private values”: the agents’ payoff functions are independent of the principal’s type. The solution is an extension of Maskin and Tirole’s...

In this paper we analyze a simple two-sided adverse selection model with one principal and one agent. They are both risk neutral and have private information about their type. We also assume that the private information of the principal is correlated with the one of the agent. The main result of...

In a class of informed principal problems with common values often used in applications we de…fine a particular mechanism which we call the assured allocation. It is always undominated, i.e. efficient among the different types of the principal. We show it is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium...

We show that, in environments with independent private values and transferable utility, a privately informed principal can solve her mechanism selection problem by implementing an allocation that is ex-ante optimal for her. No type of the principal can gain from proposing an alternative...

We show that a solution to the problem of mechanism selection by an informed principal exists in a large class of environments with “generalized private values”: the agents’ payoff functions are independent of the principal’s type. The solution is an extension of Maskin and Tirole’s...

We present a common value mechanism design model for an informed principal where only the principal has private information, but her one-dimensional private information is allowed to be distributed according to any probability measure. For this model we characterize the set of pure-strategy...

We consider the situation where the owner of some good wants to sell the good to one of several potential buyers. We assume that the owner possesses private information about the buyers' valuations of the good, and analyze this model as an informed principal mechanism design model. In an...

We show that, in environments with independent private values and transferable utility, a privately informed principal can solve her mechanism selection problem by implementing an allocation that is ex-ante optimal for her. No type of the principal can gain from proposing an alternative...

We present a common value mechanism design model for an informed principal where only the principal has private information, but her one-dimensional private information is allowed to be distributed according to any probability measure. For this model we characterize the set of pure-strategy...

In this paper we analyze a simple two-sided adverse selection model with one principaland one agent. They are both risk neutral and have private information about their type.We also assume that the private information of the principal is correlated with the one ofthe agent. The main result of...