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In this paper, we consider the organisation of international antitrust as an issue of institution design which involves a trade-off between an inadequate internalisation of external effects across jurisdictions and the risk of capture in a centralised agency. We focus on the first element of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005481708
In this paper, we analyse the scope for conflict between national merger control agencies which assert jurisdictions simultaneously. We consider a positive model of merger control in which market definition and the analysis of dominance are both explicitly specified. We find that conflict in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005481777
This paper considers merger control in a common agency framework where firms and their competitors can influence the antitrust agency and where transparency - while making lobbying less effective - also implies real resource costs. We examine the performance of two alternative standards that can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005650174