We explore the role of firms in insuring risk-averse workers. As a device that allows workers to commit to the delivery of their output, the firm arises endogenously as an alternative to the spot market if workers are sufficiently risk averse and the firm can base incentive payments on good...

This paper introduces a tractable model of health insurance with both moral hazard and adverse selection. We show that government sponsored universal basic insurance should cover treatments with the biggest adverse selection problems. Treatments not covered by basic insurance can be covered on...

This paper introduces a tractable model of health insurance with both moral hazard<br/>and adverse selection. We show that government sponsored universal basic insurance should cover treatments with the biggest adverse selection problems. Treatments not covered by basic insurance can be covered on...

This paper introduces a tractable model of health insurance with both moral hazard<br/>and adverse selection. We show that government sponsored universal basic insurance should cover treatments with the biggest adverse selection problems. Treatments not covered by basic insurance can be covered on...

Evidence suggests that unemployed individuals can sometimes affect their job prospects by undertaking a costly action like deciding to move or retrain. Realistically, such an opportunity only arises for some individuals and the identity of those may be unobservable ex-ante. The problem of...