Ensuring the involvement of private sector creditors in the resolution of sovereign debt crises is crucial to ensure an effective management and orderly resolution of those crises. A review of experience gained in past financial crises suggests that crisis management practices have been largely...

This paper empirically investigates the extent of investor moral hazard associated with IMF bailouts by analyzing the responses of sovereign bond spreads to the changes in the perceived probability of IMF bailouts of countries undergoing financial crisis. We do not find strong evidence that the...

We study a model of sovereign debt crisis that combines problems of creditor co-ordination and debtor moral hazard. Solving the sovereign debtor’s incentives leads to excessive ‘rollover failure’ by creditors when sovereign default occurs. We discuss how the incidence of crises might be...

Since the global financial crisis, the Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN), traditionally consisting mainly of countries' own foreign exchange reserves with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) acting as a backstop, has expanded significantly with the continued accumulation of reserves, the...

Since the global financial crisis, the Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN), traditionally consisting mainly of countries' own foreign exchange reserves with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) acting as a backstop, has expanded significantly with the continued accumulation of reserves, the...

Using panel data for 106 countries in 1971-1997, we estimate generalized least squares regressions to explain IMF lending as well as monetary and fiscal policies in the recipient countries. With respect to moral hazard, we find that a country's rate of monetary expansion and its government...

Credit derivatives allow for buying protection on corporate debt, but also on sovereign debt. In this paper we examine the implications for sovereign debt crises. We show that the availability of credit protection lowers ex-ante debtor moral hazard by allowing a bondholder to improve his...

The literature has not reached a consensus yet regarding the existence of sovereign creditor moral hazard. Exploiting an exceptional historical example, this paper proposes an original method to address this issue. As the corona which are observable only during a total eclipse of the sun,...

Exploiting an exceptional historical example, this paper proposes an original method to address the existence of sovereign creditor moral hazard. As the coronas which are observable only during a total eclipse of the sun, market-specific prices of repudiated bonds are observable only when...

Motivated the European debt crisis, we construct a tractable theory of sovereign debt and structural reforms under limited commitment. The government of a sovereign country which has fallen into a recession of an uncertain duration issues one-period debt and can renege on its obligations by...