Showing 1 - 8 of 8
In this paper, we show that a concept of aggregation can hold in network games. Breaking up large networks into smaller pieces, which can be replaced by representative players, leads to a coarse-grained description of strategic interactions. This method of summarizing complex strategic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011763026
In this paper, we show that a concept of aggregation can hold in large network games with linear best replies. Breaking up large networks into smaller subnetworks, which can be replaced by representative players, leads to a coarse-grained description of strategic interactions. This method of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012655535
In this paper, we show that a concept of aggregation can hold in large network games with linear best replies. Breaking up large networks into smaller subnetworks, which can be replaced by representative players, leads to a coarse-grained description of strategic interactions. This method of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013396062
This paper proposes new centrality measures to characterise the 'key class', when agents in a network are sorted into role-equivalent classes, such that its removal results in an optimal change in the network activity. The notion of role-equivalence is defined through the graph-theoretical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013396063
In this paper, we show that a concept of aggregation can hold in network games. Breaking up large networks into smaller pieces, which can be replaced by representative players, leads to a coarse-grained description of strategic interactions. This method of summarizing complex strategic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011943088
In this paper, we develop a new game theoretic network centrality measure based on the Shapley value. To do so, we consider a coalitional game, where the worth of each coalition is the total play in the game introduced in Ballester et al. (2006). We first establish that the game is convex. As a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012664389
In this paper, we develop a new game theoretic network centrality measure based on the Shapley value. To do so, we consider a coalitional game, where the worth of each coalition is the total play in the game introduced in Ballester et al. (2006). We first establish that the game is convex. As a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012584076
This paper proposes new centrality measures to characterise the 'key class', when agents in a network are sorted into role-equivalent classes, such that its removal results in an optimal change in the network activity. The notion of role-equivalence is defined through the graph-theoretical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012655551