We study the stability properties of organizations in partition function games, describing cooperative situations with externalities. An organization is defined as a group of agents, together with a set of bilateral relations, formally, a connected graph. Because of the presence of...

We study the incentives of oligoplistic firms to share private information on demand parameters. Differently from previous studies, we consider bilateral sharing agreements, by which firms commit at the ex-ante stage to truthfully share information. We show that if signals are i.i.d., then...

We study the problem of information sharing in oligopoly, when sharing decisions are taken before the realization of private signals. Using the general model developed by Raith (1996), we show that if firms are allowed to make bilateral exclusive sharing agreements, then some degree of...

We study the stability properties of organizations in partition function games, describing cooperative situations with externalities. An organization is defined as a group of agents, together with a set of bilateral relations, formally, a connected graph. Because of the presence of...

The trade-off between the costs and benefits of disclosing a firm's private information has been the object of a vast literature. The absence of incentives to share information on a common market demand prior to competition has been advocated to interpret information sharing as evidence of...

We study the incentives of oligoplistic firms to share private information on demand parameters. Differently from previous studies, we consider bilateral sharing agreements, by which firms commit at the ex-ante stage to truthfully share information. We show that if signals are i.i.d., then...

We study the problem of information sharing in oligopoly, when sharing decisions are taken before the realization of private signals. Using the general model developed by Raith (1996), we show that if firms are allowed to make bilateral exclusive sharing agreements, then some degree of...

How should an organization be designed in order to provide its members with minimal incentives to defect? And how does the optimal design depend on the type of strategic interaction between defectors and remaining organizational members? This paper addresses such issues in a game theoretic model...

In a recent paper, Demange (2004) has shown that hierarchical organizations can guarantee the existence of stable cooperative outcomes by appropriately allocating the blocking power to a subset of coalitions, the “teams”. This paper extends the analysis of Demange to cooperative problems...

We study the problem of information sharing in oligopoly, when sharing decisions are taken before the realization of private signals. Using the general model developed by Raith (1996), we show that if firms are allowed to make bilateral exclusive sharing agreements, then some degree of...