Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71 …, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between … results that relate situations of positive externalities with stable networks that cannot be "too dense" in a well …

into account the potential externalities networks produce. Once social ties are in place, these externalities shape the … norms are easily sustained in symmetric networks. By contrast, when an efficient interaction requires players to play …

opportunities to identify learning rules, since on networks (compared to, e.g., random matching) more rules differ in terms of their …

This paper studies fictitious play in networks of noncooperative two-person games. We show that continuous … functions do not possess the continuous-time fictitious-play property. As extensions, we consider networks in which each … zero-sum networks. Applications include security games, conflict networks, and decentralized wireless channel selection. …

This paper studies fictitious play in networks of noncooperative two-player games. We show that continuous …-play property. As an extension, we consider networks in which each bilateral game is strategically zero-sum, a weighted potential …, which entails a generalization of Robinson's theorem to arbitrary zero-sum networks. Applications include security games …

complementarity in actions, efficiency can be either associated to more sparse or denser networks, depending on the size of the …

into account the potential externalities networks produce. Once social ties are in place, these externalities shape the … norms are easily sustained in symmetric networks. By contrast, when an efficient interaction requires players to play …