This paper studies the target projection dynamic, which is a model of myopic adjustment for population games. We put it into the standard microeconomic framework of utility maximization with control costs. We also show that it is well-behaved, since it satisfies the desirable properties: Nash...

This paper studies the target projection dynamic, which is a model of myopic adjustment for population games. We put it into the standard microeconomic framework of utility maximization with control costs. We also show that it is well-behaved, since it satisfies the desirable properties: Nash...

This note characterizes ordinal potential games by the absence of weak improvement cycles and an order condition on the strategy space.This order condition is automatically satisfied if the strategy space is countable.

We focus on axiomatizations of the Pareto equilibrium concept in multicriteria games based on consistency.Axiomatizations of the Nash equilibrium concept by Peleg and Tijs (1996) and Peleg, Potters, and Tijs (1996) have immediate generalizations.The axiomatization of Norde et al.(1996) cannot be...

The function that assigns to each matrix game (i.e., the mixed extension of a finite zero-sum two-player game) its value is axiomatized by a number of intuitive properties.

A product set of pure strategies is a prep set (prep is short for preparation) if it contains at least one best reply to any consistent belief that a player may have about the strategic behavior of his opponents. Minimal prep sets are shown to exists in a class of strategic games satisfying...

A product set of pure strategies is a prep set ("prep" is short for "preparation") if it contains at least one best reply to any consistent belief that a player may have about the strategic behavior of his opponents. Minimal prep sets are shown to exists in a class of strategic games satisfying...