We study a particular class of cost sharing games – "data games" – covering situations wheresome players own data which are useful for a project pursued by the set of all players. Theproblem is to set up compensations between players. Data games are subadditive butgenerally not concave, and...

A community faces the obligation of providing an indivisible public good. Each member is capable of providing it at a certain cost and the solution is to rely on the player who can do it at the lowest cost. It is then natural that he or she be compensated by the other players. The question is to...

A group of firms decides to cooperate on a project that requires a combination of inputs held by some of them. These inputs are non-rival but excludable goods i.e. public goods with exclusion such as knowledge, data or information, patents or copyrights. We address the question of how firms...

A community faces the obligation of providing an indivisible public good. Each member is capable of providing it at a certain cost and the solution is to rely on the player who can do it at the lowest cost. It is then natural that he or she be compensated by the other players. The question is to...

A group of firms consider collaborating on a project which requires a combination of elements which are owned by some of them. These elements are nonrival but excludable goods i.e. public goods with exclusion like for instance knowledge, data or informations, patents or copyrights. We address...