Demands and concessions in a multi-stage bargaining process are shaped by the probabilities that each side will prevail in an impasse. Standard game-theoretic predictions are quite sharp: demands are pushed to the precipice with nothing left on the table, but there is no conflict regardless of...

This paper considers a class of models in which rank-based payoffs are sensitive to small amounts of noise in decision making. Examples include auction, price-competition, coordination, and location games. Observed laboratory behavior in these games is often responsive to asymmetric costs...

This paper characterizes behavior with "noisy" decision making for a general class of N-person, binary-choice games. Applications include: participation games, voting, market entry, binary step-level public goods games, the volunteer's dilemma, the El Farol problem, etc. A simple graphical...

Recent theoretical advances have dramatically increased the relevance of game theory for predicting human behavior in interactive situation. By relaxing the assumptions of perfect rationality and perfect foresight, we obtain much improved explanations of (i) initial decisions (ii)dynamic...

Demands and concessions in a multi-stage bargaining process are shaped by the probabilities that each side will prevail in an impasse. Standard game-theoretic predictions are quite sharp: demands are pushed to the precipice with nothing left on the table, but there is no conflict regardless of...

Demands and concessions in a multi-stage bargaining process are shaped by the probabilities that each side will prevail in an impasse. Standard game-theoretic predictions are quite sharp: demands are pushed to the precipice with nothing left on the table, but there is no conflict regardless of...