We study the compliance behavior of artisanal fishermen in central-southern Chile. Our empirical analysis explores the role of individual morality and perception of legitimacy as determinant factors in the decision to violate regulations. The results indicate that both individual moral standing...

We examine individual harvesters’ preferences for government enforcement of a quota imposed on the exploitation of a common pool resource. We develop a model of Nash behavior by identical risk neutral harvesters to explain individual equilibrium preferences for enforcement of an efficient...

With data from framed common pool resource experiments conducted with artisanal fishing communities in Colombia, we estimate a hierarchical linear model to investigate within-group and between-group variation in individual harvest strategies across several institutions. Our results suggest that...

This paper uses experimental data to test for a complementary relationship between formal regulations imposed on a community to conserve a local natural resource and nonbinding verbal agreements to do the same. Our experiments were conducted in the field in three regions of Colombia. Each group...

This article uses experimental data to test for a complementary relationship between formal regulations imposed on a community to conserve a local natural resource and non-binding verbal agreements to do the same. Our experiments were conducted in the field in three regions of Colombia. Our...

This paper presents the results from a series of framed field experiments conducted in fishing communities off the Caribbean coast of Colombia. The goal is to investigate the relative effectiveness of exogenous regulatory pressure and pro-social emotions in promoting cooperative behavior in a...