In the context of a global security framework that mitigates interstate conflicts, nation-states establish a reputation … corroborates the role of reputation-building through co-ethnicity narratives as a determinant of sponsor state engagement. We argue …

remains unclear. In each of six treatments that vary the cooperation premium and the informational basis for reputation … forces of (a) learning about the benefits of reputation, and (b) learning about backward unraveling. We find, inter alia …, that with a high cooperation premium and good information, investment in reputation grows across sets of finitely …

remains unclear. In each of six treatments that vary the cooperation premium and the informational basis for reputation … forces of (a) learning about the benefits of reputation, and (b) learning about backward unraveling. We find, inter alia …, that with a high cooperation premium and good information, investment in reputation grows across sets of finitely …

, by grading honestly, a school can build up reputation. Introducing a concern for reputation into an established signaling …

applications it is desirable that nodes can join anonymously, but anonymity makes it easy to spread false reputation information. A … limitations of the DSP solution space; and we gradually reduce the impact of adversarial behaviour in P2P reputation systems using … heuristic methods. As a side effect of our work, we present a special-purpose framework for simulation of P2P reputation systems …

Gegenstand dieser Arbeit ist die Betrachtung der Reputation eines Unternehmens aus ?konomischer Sicht. Die … Unternehmensreputation. Die Reputation wird hier mit einem betriebswirtschaftlichen Kosten-Nutzen Kalk?l betrachtet. Nur mit einer Reputation … wird.Die Genese der ?konomischen Reputation erfolgt durch den Reputationstr?ger, d.h. im Unternehmen. Um die Werttreiber …

motivate employeeswho are driven by concerns about their reputation for being able. When employeesare driven by monetary …

reputation for honesty. We characterize conditions under which there exists a 'two-tier equilibrium' in which 'reputable …' auditors refuse bribes offered by clients for fear of losing reputation, while 'disreputable' auditors accept bribes because … even persistent refusal does not create a good reputation. The main findings are: (a) honest auditors charge higher fees …