This paper describes a search model with a continuum of workerand job types, transferable utility and an increasing returns to scale contact technology. We apply a second order Taylor expansion to characterize the equilibrium. One third of theincreasing returns in contacts are absorbed by firms...

Is moving to the countryside a credible commitment device for couples? Weinvestigate whether lowering the arrival rate of potential alternative partners bymoving to a less populated area lowers the dissolution risk for a sample of Danishcouples. We find that of the couples who married in the...

We analyze the implications of multiple applications by job seekers for the microfoundations of the matching function. We emphasize a coordination failure caused by multiple applications, namely, that firms can waste resources processing applicants who are ultimately hired elsewhere.

This paper shows that we can normalize job and worker characteristics so that, without frictions,there exists a linear relationship between wages on the one hand and worker and job type indiceson the other. However, for five European countries and the United States we find strong evidencefor a...

We examine wage competition in a model where identical workers choose the number of jobs to apply for and identical firms simultaneously post a wage. The Nash equilibrium of this game exhibits the following properties: (i) an equilibrium where workers apply for just one job exhibits unemployment...

Do people move to cities because of marriage market considerations? In citiessingles can meet more potential partners than in rural areas. Singles are thereforeprepared to pay a premium in terms of higher housing prices. Once married, themarriage market benefits disappear while the housing...

We study the effect of diminishing search frictions in markets with adverse selection by presenting a model in which agents with private information can simultaneously contact multiple trading partners. We highlight a new trade-off: facilitating contacts reduces coordination frictions but also...

I develop a directed search model of the labor market in which firms choose a recruiting intensity, determining the number of applicants they will interview. Interviewing applicants is costly but reveals their productivity, allowing the firm to hire better workers. I characterize the equilibrium...