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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011448381
This chapter examines the conceptual foundations of the concept of strategic equilibrium and its various variants and refinements. The emphasis is very much on the underlying ideas rather than on any technical details.After an examination of some pre-equilibrium ideas, in particular the concept...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024503
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010483754
The central concept of noncooperative game theory is that of the \emph{strategic equilibrium} (or Nash equilibrium, or noncooperative equilibrium). In this chapter we discuss some of the conceptual issues surrounding this concept and its refinements. Many of these issues have received increasing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407581
A game-theoretic model of territorial environmental production under Cournot competition is studied. The process is modeled as cooperative differential game. The stable distribution mechanism of the common cooperative benefit among players is proposed. We proved that the cooperative total stock...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009018944
When a strategic situation arises repeatedly, the possibility arises that equilibrium predictions can be justified by a dynamic adjustment process. We examine myopic adjustment dynamics, a class that includes replicator dynamics from evolutionary game theory, simple models of imitation, models...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766802
When a strategic situation arises repeatedly, the possibility arises that equilibrium predictions can be justified by a dynamic adjustment process. We examine myopic adjustment dynamics, a class that includes replicator dynamics from evolutionary game theory, simple models of imitation, models...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012235814
We consider a continuous-time variant of the classical Economic Lot-Sizing (ELS) problem. In this model, the setup cost is a continuous function with lower bound $K_min 0$, the demand and holding costs are integrable functions of time and the replenishment decisions are not restricted to be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011094057
This paper introduces two set valued Nash equilibrium refinements that are a natural generalization of the concept of stable set of equilibria introduced in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) and satisfy all the properties defined in Mertens (1989). It also establishes a connection between Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011094061