We introduce public signals and cognitive dissonance into the standard Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki (ASY) model of tax evasion. It turns out that the presence of cognitive dissonanceattenuates tax evasion as individuals dislike allowing their true bevhaviour to diverge from their public statement...

Summary In the present paper, I analyse the competitive behaviour of benevolent governments in the presence of (capital) income tax evasion when information exchange is not possible. My approach is to introduce a cost of evasion function into an otherwise standard tax competition model and to...

We introduce public signals and cognitive dissonance into the standard Allingham-Sandmo- Yitzhaki (ASY) model of tax evasion. It turns out that the pres- ence of cognitive dissonance attenuates tax evasion as individuals dislike allowing their true bevhaviour to diverge from their public...

In the present paper, 1 analyse the competitive behaviour of benevolent governments in the presence of (capital) income tax evasion when information exchange is not possible. My approach is to introduce a cost of evasion function into an otherwise standard tax competition model and to explore...

We introduce public signals and cognitive dissonance into the standard Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki (ASY) model of tax evasion. It turns out that the pres- ence of cognitive dissonanceattenuates tax evasion as individuals dislike allowing their true bevhaviour to diverge from their public statement...