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This paper reports experimental tests of two alternative explanations of how players use focal points to select equilibria in one-shot coordination games. Cognitive hierarchy theory explains coordination as the result of common beliefs about players' pre-reflective inclinations towards the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277475
Coordination on focal points in one shot games can often be explained by team reasoning, a departure from individualistic choice theory. However, a less exotic explanation of coordination is also available based on best-responding to uniform randomisation. We test the team reasoning explanation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011111846
This paper reports experimental tests of two alternative explanations of how players use focal points to select equilibria in one-shot coordination games. Cognitive hierarchy theory explains coordination as the result of common beliefs about players’ pre-reflective inclinations towards the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200580
This paper reports experimental tests of two alternative explanations of how players use focal points to select equilibria in one-shot coordination games. Cognitive hierarchy theory explains coordination as the result of common beliefs about players’ pre-reflective inclinations towards the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552245
Since homo sapiens is a social animal, one might expect human nature the set of psychological propensities with which our species is naturally endowed to equip human beings to live in social groups. In this chapter, we consider the implications of this idea for economics and game theory. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023673