We analyze a two-stage game between two heterogeneous players.At stage one, common risk is chosen by one of the players. At stagetwo, both players observe the given level of risk and simultaneouslyinvest in a winner-take-all competition. The game is solved theoreticallyand then tested by using...

We introduce a concept of emotions that emerge when workers compare their own performance with the performances of co-workers. Assuming heterogeneity among the workers the interplay of emotions and incentives is analyzed within the framework of rank-order tournaments which are frequently used in...

Several empirical studies have challenged tournament theory by pointing out that (1) there is considerable pay variation within hierarchy levels, (2) promotion premiums only in part explain hierarchical wage differences and (3) external recruitment is observable on nearly any hierarchy level. We...

In practice, two types of tournaments can be distinguished - U-type and J-type tournaments. In U-type tournaments, workers receive prizes that have been fixed in advance. In J-type tournaments, the employer fixes an aggregate wage bill in advance, which is then shared among the workers according...

We empirically investigate if tournaments between heterogeneous contestants are less intensive. To test our hypotheses we use professional sports data from the TOYOTA Handball-Bundesliga, the major handball league in Germany.[...]

Following tournament theory, incentives will be rather low if the contestants ofa tournament are heterogeneous. We empirically test this prediction using alarge dataset from the German Hockey League. Our results show that indeed theintensity of a game is lower if the teams are more...

We study risk-taking behavior in a simple two person tournament in a theoretical model as well as a laboratory experiment. First, a model is analyzed in which two agents simultaneously decide between a risky and a safe strategy and we allow for all possible degrees of correlation between the...

Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequential. We show that agents' strategic behavior in sequential-move tournaments significantly differ from the one in simultaneous-move tournaments: In a sequential-move tournament with heterogeneous...