Given a large enough population of voters whose utility functions satisfy certain statistical regularities, we show that voting rules such as the Borda rule, approval voting, and evaluative voting have a very high probability of selecting the social alternative which maximizes the utilitarian...

We show that, in a sufficiently large population satisfying certain statistical regularities, it is often possible to accurately estimate the utilitarian social welfare function, even if we only have very noisy data about individual utility functions and interpersonal utility comparisons. In...

We introduce a two-stage ranking of multidimensional alternatives, including uncertain prospects as particular case, when these objects can be given a suitable matrix form. The first stage defines a ranking of rows and a ranking of columns, and the second stage ranks matrices by applying natural...

Suppose it is possible to make approximate interpersonal comparisons of welfare gains and losses. Thus, if w, x, y, and z are personal psychophysical states (each encoding all ethically relevant information about the physical and mental state of a person), then it sometimes possible to say,...

The Clarke pivotal mechanism is inappropriate for nonpecuniary public goods, because the assumption of quasilinear utility is invalid, and because the mechanism gives disproportionate influence to wealthier voters. But by introducing a `stochastic' Clarke tax, we can convert any separable...

We develop a model of social choice over lotteries, where people's psychological characteristics are mutable, their preferences may be incomplete, and approximate interpersonal comparisons of well-being are possible. Formally, we suppose individual preferences are described by a...

We consider collective decisions under uncertainty, when agents have generalized Hurwicz preferences, a broad class allowing many different ambiguity attitudes, including subjective expected utility preferences. We consider sequences of acts that are "almost-objectively uncertain" in the sense...